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What evidence and lessons are there regarding how large-scale cash transfer programmes 
(especially humanitarian) have adapted to remain relevant in situations of high and accelerating 
inflation?   
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1. Overview 
The use of Cash Transfers (CTs) in developing regions arose as the understanding grew that 
some other types of aid programmes were not effectively attaining their goals. For instance, 
emergency food aid was responding to famines, but it was unable to add to food stability. Over 
time, the persistently poor became ever more reliant on food aid. Some Sub-Saharan African 
countries with early experiences with cash transfers, such as Malawi, had also confronted this 
problem and turned to cash transfers. However, the value of cash transfers can also wear down 
significantly in a high inflation environment. Unless the cash transfers are indexed to food prices, 
food transfers may be more suitable. Thus, cash transfers are not a universal solution, and local 
factors limiting their effectiveness need to be carefully considered (Garcia and Moore, 2012). As 
a result, countries such as Ethiopia currently use a combination of cash and food transfers 
(Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2010).1 
This report mainly relies on grey literature and various reports issued by development agencies 
that implement Cash Transfer programmes – due to the nature of the query and the lack of 
academic literature particularly on how cash transfer programmes adapt to inflation contexts. 
Key highlights:2 
 Pakistan runs a big cash transfer programme – called the National Cash Transfers 
Programme, which historically adjusted to inflation levels.  
o The programme is estimated to reach 2.7 million beneficiaries and is supported by 
DFID with over £300 million over the 2012-2020 period.  
o In the past, the financial resources available for the programme have been steadily 
rising to make sure that the cash transfer payments keep pace with inflation. 
o Particularly, DFID’s Stability and Growth programme helped to reduce the impact of 
economic reforms on the poorest, for example, incentivising the government to raise 
stipends to keep pace with inflation. The annual review of the programme from 
2018 indicated that the Government of Pakistan may stop the Stability and Growth 
programme, in accordance with IMF’s reform programme and austerity budget. This, 
unfortunately, means that future stipends may not keep up with inflation – reducing 
the real purchasing power of beneficiaries. 
 The Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia is a very big cash transfer scheme 
which had been under routine adjustment because of high inflation levels in the country in 
recent years – particularly on cereals and food items consumed by the poor. 
o Beneficiaries are estimated to be 8 million individuals. In its current 4th phase 
(running between 2015-2020), DFID is supporting it by about £276 million. 
                                                   
1 The rise of cash transfers overlaps with the growing importance of social protection programmes on 
development agendas around the world (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009). The proliferation of cash transfers is a 
phenomenon that has arisen within the global south, where countries have set up programmes that meet their 
own unique needs (Hanlon, Barrientos, and Hulme 2010). 
2 Some fruitful very large cash transfer programmes (e.g. PSNP in Ethiopia and HSNP in Kenya) had seen 
multiple extensions. In these cases, the report discusses primarily about the latest versions of the programmes 
for which adequate material (in terms of Business cases and annual reviews) are available. However, this report 
also additionally refers to some insights from the older versions of the programme. 
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o A key component of the programme monitors the adequacy of the transfer 
value by monitoring its purchasing power (i.e. loss due to inflation). 
o The Government of Ethiopia, which runs the programme, has been adjusting the 
value of the transfer/wage in line with inflation. 
 The Hunger Safety Net Programme in Kenya is another big cash transfer programme that 
had also been adjusting the size of transfers because of inflation. 
o It is estimated to support 600,000 individuals – where about 60% are women. In its 
current 2nd phase (2013-19), DFID supports the programme with over £119 million. 
o Shocks linked to inflation are tackled by programme design – where DFID holds a 
contingency budget of 6% of the total costs. 
o By design, the programme uses an annual inflation rate of 5%. However, the annual 
review from 2018 advised to use actual inflation rates instead. 
 The Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty programme in Ghana had carried out cash 
transfer schemes that at times corrected for inflation. 
o DFID had contributed over £30 million for the programme over the 2012-17 period – 
benefiting about 100,000 individuals, 60% of whom were women. 
o Although the programme’s business case and recommendations from annual reviews 
noted the need for regular/annual amendments to transfers (in line with inflation), 
actual revisions were only made after consultation with stakeholders. 
 The Keeping Girls in School programme in Malawi had a cash transfer/bursary component 
which responded to periods of high inflation in the country. 
o About 200,000 girls in primary school had benefited from the cash transfers by the 
programme. DFID noted that different donors took part in addressing different 
programme components and programme funding was over £36 million. 
o Due to severe inflation in the Malawian currency/Kwacha, DFID decided to allow 
project budgets and disbursements to be done in Pound Sterling. In some cases 
(especially due to forex gains), this move saved a considerable amount of project 
budget. 
 Some of the major cash transfer programmes in the Southern African region have adjusted 
for inflation. In other cases, e.g. government cash transfers in Zimbabwe, there is little 
evidence of inflation related adjustments. 
o In Botswana, the Old Age Pension Programme, which was a big cash transfer 
programme (costing 0.4% of GDP), has assisted poor elderly people – while 
maintaining the real value of the transfers through annual adjustments for inflation. 
o In Zambia, major cash transfer programmes have been carried out in five districts – 
reaching tens of thousands of households in their pilot phase alone. The nominal 
value of transfers was raised by 10% every couple of years for inflation. 
o In Zimbabwe, a diverse array of cash transfer programmes existed. However, there 
is no clear evidence on how these programmes adjusted to Zimbabwe’s recurrent 
episodes of hyperinflation. What little evidence there is hints that cash transfers never 
kept up with inflation. Major donor supported cash transfer programmes in the 
country (e.g. the DFID supported Protracted Relief Programme) had at times resorted 
to conducting transfers in foreign currency. Unfortunately, this alternative is no more 
tenable since the government has repudiated the use of foreign currencies for cash 
transfers. 
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2. Cash Transfer Programmes: Brief Definition 
Cash transfer programmes offer non-contributory cash grants to beneficiaries to satisfy 
minimum consumption needs. Sometimes these programmes are also known as social cash 
transfer or social transfer programmes. The transfers are non-contributory in the sense that 
recipients do not pay into a system that afterwards awards them the transfers. They partially or 
wholly exclude self-funded pension systems or other forms of deferred compensation. This 
definition includes non-contributory pensions, poverty-based transfers, and family grants. 
Beneficiaries do not have to work to receive transfers; thus, public works and guaranteed 
employment programmes are excluded. Nevertheless, other requirements or conditions may be 
placed on beneficiaries before they can receive their cash transfers. (Garcia and Moore, 2012) 
Cash transfers are typically provided with relief or development goals in mind. Emergency cash 
transfers are delivered to help households smooth their consumption – in the face of a major 
crisis, while cash transfers for development are commonly given at regular intervals for an 
extended period (i.e. longer-term basis). Many cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa contain 
elements designed for both purposes. (Garcia and Moore, 2012) 
Cash transfer programmes could be conditional or unconditional. Unconditional cash transfers 
(UCTs) deliver cash to all eligible and registered recipients. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) 
deliver benefits just to beneficiaries who have fulfilled prearranged conditions, known also as co-
responsibilities. Typical conditions include the requirement that children regularly attend school; 
that they get prescribed medical check-ups; or that a household adult attend educational 
seminars on topics like basic nutrition, health, and other topics. (Garcia and Moore, 2012) 
3. Case Studies: How Cash Transfer (CT) Programmes 
Adapt to Inflation 
3.1 National Cash Transfers Programme (Pakistan) 
Brief Programme Summary: (PNCTP Business Case, 2012 & Annual Review, 2018)  
 Full title: Pakistan National Cash Transfers Programme (PNCTP) 
 Programme Value: £300.3 million 
 Estimated No. of recipients: 2.7 million by 2020, 1.05 million of them primary school children 
 Start Date Nov. 2012 & End Date: Mar. 2020 
 Programme Code: 203029 
DevTracker link to business case: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
203029/documents 
 
Programme Details: (PNCTP Business Case, 2012) 
Under PNCTP, DFID is offering up to £300.3 million to the Benazir Income Support Programme 
(BISP). BISP is a government programme, which delivers basic income support to poor women 
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and their families. 87% of BISP funding is supplied by the Government of Pakistan while the rest 
(13%) comes from donors such as DFID, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. 
Beneficiaries are identified through a poverty scorecard using data from the National Socio-
Economic Registry (NSER). Through this additional income support, women can spend more on 
food, health, education, clothing and other essential needs. BISP assists the poor to mitigate 
the impact of inflation and economic shocks on their household expenditure – thus, 
safeguarding them from falling deeper into poverty.  
DFID Pakistan’s investment concentrates on two of BISP’s programmes:  
 The unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programme: BISP identifies recipients using the 
NSER. The female head of the family or an ever-married woman in the identified household 
gets a quarterly stipend of Rs.4700 (£35) every three months. She can, then, make choices 
on how to spend this money on essential necessities. This support is instrumental to ease 
the impact of inflation and protect poor families from falling deeper into poverty.  
 The conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme for education: BISP’s eligible families get 
an extra stipend of Rs.750 (£5.50) per child every three months for their children to enrol in 
and attend primary school. The stipend is conditional on at least 70% attendance in each 
quarter. The CCT programme runs in 32 districts across Pakistan: Balochistan (6 districts), 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (7 districts), Punjab (7 districts), Sindh (6 districts), Gilgit-Baltistan (3 
districts) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (3 districts).  
 
Evidence on Adaptation to Inflation: (PNCTP Annual Review, 2018) 
Pakistan’s current government has regularly raised the financial resources available for 
BISP. This is to cover the expanding number of beneficiaries as well as to make sure that the 
value of payments keeps up with inflation. The government’s expenditure on BISP was 
considerable – constituting the equivalent to 0.35% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 3% of the 
Federal tax revenues, and 19% of the entire Federal Public Sector Development Programme 
(PSDP) in 2015-16. 50% of the financial aid via DFID’s Stability and Growth (S&G) 
programme goes to BISP to dampen the impact of economic reforms on the poorest, for 
instance, incentivising the government to increase stipends to along with inflation. 
The unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programme is growing so that more poor families obtain a 
basic cash transfer for spending on food, health, clothing and other essential items. This support 
is needed to help mitigate the impacts of inflation and economic shocks on household 
expenditure. Another objective is to incentivise enhancements in the regularity and security of 
payments. 
 
Lessons Learnt: (PNCTP Annual Review, 2018) 
 The allocation of adequate funds by the Government of Pakistan to fund BISP’s expansion 
had to be monitored. The expansion of both the UCT and the CCT programmes put pressure 
on the budget when the government had an austerity budget. The end of the S&G 
programme which enabled the Government to raise stipends to keep pace with inflation 
(as part of the IMF programme) meant that future stipends may fall behind the rising 
costs of food and other necessities. Engagement with the Ministry of Finance and 
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negotiation of new disbursement linked indicators were needed to ensure that the stipend 
keept pace with inflation.  
 Building beneficiaries’ ability to increase their incomes is expected to free the fiscal 
space in the medium term – so that the Government can continue raising stipends to 
keep pace with inflation and expand BISP’s CCT programming. During the Mid-Term 
Review of the programme, consideration will be given to how BISP will work in the latter part 
of the Pakistan National Cash Transfers Programme (PNCTP) with provinces to deliver a 
broader package of support that help beneficiaries build stronger livelihoods and exit 
BISP. 
 DFID has encouraged BISP to make a rapid transition from the Pakistan Post to 
electronic payments for greater efficiency in beneficiary payments. 
 Effective, regular communications with beneficiaries, effective feedback loops and 
grievance redress mechanisms were essential to ensure that BISP continued to deliver 
effectively for the beneficiaries.  
 
3.2 Productive Safety Net Programme (Ethiopia) 
Brief Programme Summary: (PSNP Business Case, 2015 & Annual Review, 2018)  
 Full title: Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) Phase 4 
 Programme Value: £276 million  
 Estimated No. of recipients: 8 million people 
 Start Date: 2015 (15.12.14 design) & End Date: 2020 
 Programme Code: 204290 
 DevTracker link to business case: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
204290/documents 
 
Programme Details: (PSNP Annual Review, 2018; PSNP Business Case, 2015) 
The Productive Safety Net Programme (currently in the fourth phase) is the Government of 
Ethiopia’s flagship programme for social protection, food security, resilience against drought and 
other shocks, and livelihood development for the poorest households. PSNP originated in 2005 
through the consensus between the Government and donors that successive annual emergency 
food aid appeals were not an appropriate or effective way of dealing with chronic hunger. The 
programme delivers a structured response to expected food insecurity and shocks, reducing the 
need for expensive emergency response.  
The PSNP allows poor households with able bodied adult members to work on community-
planned public works in return for cash or food transfers for six months of the year, timed to 
overlap with the lean season. As from the start of 2017/18 year, the transfer value is equivalent in 
value to 15kg of cereals per household member per month (pegged at the price of wheat), or its 
cash equivalent. Public works activities are planned and designed to deal with vulnerabilities and 
contribute to the development of communities. The labour-intensive public work activities include 
soil and water conservation measures, school room construction or rehabilitation, community 
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water projects, community road construction and rehabilitation, small-scale irrigation, health post 
construction and renovation. 
The programme also fulfils the needs of those who are poor but cannot work. Extremely 
vulnerable households without able-bodied adults get direct support throughout the year without 
the need to participate in public works. Women who take part in community works are entitled to 
leave the work and receive cash or food assistance from the fourth month of pregnancy. The 
programme supports about 8 million chronically food insecure beneficiaries in 350 chronically 
food insecure districts and their chronically food insecure communities.  
Alongside cash or food transfers and public works, the programme is providing a set of 
livelihoods interventions that enable poor households to save, develop business plans, access 
microcredit, diversify sources of income, and move out of poverty. PSNP also includes an 
emergency response mechanism for exceptional years – this was, for instance, deployed in 
2017/18. Under the current phase, DFID contributes £276m to a total programme cost valued at 
£2.5bn. PSNP is supported by 11 donors, with an increasing financial and in-kind contribution 
from the Government of Ethiopia. A Donor Coordination Team supports coordination and 
programme management and leads liaison between the Government and development partners 
(DPs). Support to PSNP4 is central to DFID Ethiopia’s business plan and is instrumental to 
headline nutrition results.  
 
Evidence on Adaptation to Inflation: (PSNP Annual Review, 2018; PSNP 
Business Case, 2015) 
Under PSNP 4, the thresholds for different procurement processes have been increased, to 
reflect the effect of inflation – because these thresholds were set out under the previous phase 
(i.e. for PSNP 3).  One important component of the programme (Indicator 2.3) monitors the 
adequacy of the transfer value by monitoring its purchasing power. In 2017/18, the real value of 
the transfer diminished by over 25%. Between March 2017 and March 2018, the food prices 
soared by 19.9%; the price increase for bread and cereals was even higher at 24.9%. Based on 
World Bank analysis of CSA Consumer Price Index 2018, the wage rate could purchase only 
11.5 kg of cereals on average. Consequently, no regions could purchase the full 15kg on the 
wage rate paid in 2017/18. Nevertheless, the government recognised this issue and pushed up 
the wage rate by 20% for 2018/19. There are still concerns at the Federal, regional and sub-
regional level that this rise is not adequate to mitigate the impact of inflation. This issue needs 
resolution through a policy decision on updating the wage rate periodically because of inflation 
and zonal differences in market conditions.  
However, there has been an important shift towards paying PSNP clients in cash. Cash is more 
flexible than food, giving clients more choice and control, reducing risk and overheads. In 
2015/16, 38% of PSNP recipients were paid in cash, 39% in food and 23% with a combination. In 
2016/17, 60% of beneficiaries received cash, 20% received food and 20% received a 
combination. Along with this shift, electronic payments are being introduced to the programme so 
that cash is paid using e-payment technology – instead of hand delivering cash. This is also 
expected to surge saving by beneficiaries, lower overheads, delays and risk.  
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Lessons Learnt: (PSNP Annual Review, 2018) 
 The Government had to review the effect of inflation and local market conditions on the value 
of transfer periodically, at least on an annual basis.  
 Policy parameters for adjusting the cash transfer/wage-rate had to be clearly defined to 
protect the purchasing power of transfers.  
 Peace and security, continuity of programme leadership, government’s own motivations for 
delivery at pace, and political support are instrumental for resolving recurring issues in the 
programme, particularly delays in cash and food transfers, and for maintaining the value of 
the transfer to manage the negative impacts of inflation.  
 
3.3 The Hunger Safety Net Programme (Kenya) 
Brief Programme Summary: (HSNP Business Case, 2012 & Annual Review, 2018)  
 Full title: The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) Phase 2 
 Programme Value: £119.85 million 
 Estimated No. of recipients: 600,000 people, 60% women 
 Start Date Nov. 2013 & End Date: 2019 
 Programme Code: 204258 
 DevTracker link to business case: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
200762/documents 
 
Programme Details: (HSNP Project completion Review, 2018; Business Case, 2012) 
The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) is the biggest component of DFID’s 10-year support 
to the social protection sector in Kenya. It is an unconditional cash transfer (CT) programme, 
where cash is provided to bank accounts of very poor people and can be spent on the needs of 
the household with no limits. HSNP intends to lower poverty, hunger and vulnerability of the 
poorest households living in four counties of Kenya (Marsabit, Mandera, Turkana and Wajir) in 
the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs). ASALs are regularly food insecure and rates of acute 
malnutrition usually surpass emergency thresholds. This is mainly because of environmental 
shocks (e.g. recurring droughts), market shocks (e.g. inflation on food items) and security 
shocks.  
HSNP is one of the four cash transfer programmes under the National Safety Net Programme 
(NSNP) of the Government of Kenya. The other three are:  
(i) Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT);  
(ii) Cash Transfers for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC); and  
(iii) Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT).  
HSNP has been rolled out in two phases. The initial phase (2007-2013) piloted cash transfers as 
an alternative to costly and usually poorly targeted food aid that was provided during drought 
seasons. Regular electronic cash transfers (bi-monthly KES 3,500 or £26 per household) were 
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provided to about 69,000 chronically poor households (which translates to about 496,800 people, 
49% of whom were women) through biometric smart cards.  
The subsequent phase (2013 to 2019) extended the reach to nearly 100,000 households (or 
about 600,000 people, 60% women). These households, termed Group 1, obtained regular 
electronic cash transfers, with the amount progressively increasing to KES 5,400 or £42 bi-
monthly, paid directly into bank accounts. Payments were accessed with a bank card via 
biometric or PIN recognition. Phase 2 also involved a shock-responsive mechanism, which 
enabled the programme to expand its coverage during periods of drought to an extra 270,000 
households. These households, termed Group 2, were entitled to obtain one-time cash payments 
(KES 2,700 or £21 per month) when emergency payments were activated.  
UK support for Phase 1 was £40.5 million. Funding for Phase 2 was £81.59 million for the initial 
period from 2013 to 2017. An additional allocation of £18.3 million was made for the period April 
2017 to March 2018 when the work to design a third (and final) phase of UK support started. 
Following changes to the DFID Kenya HSNP advisory and programme management team, a 
decision was made to further extend Phase 2 to allow the team more time to explore delivery 
options for Phase 3. The programme was extended for another year (April 2018-March 2019) 
and the budget increased by £19.8 million. This raised DFID’s total support to HSNP 2 to 
£119.85m.  
The third and final phase of HSNP, April 2019 to March 2024, is rooted in a new £200m World 
Bank programme called the Kenya Social and Economic Inclusion Project (KSEIP), with a UK 
funding to HSNP worth £74.45 million. KSEIP has an overarching objective of bolstering delivery 
systems for improved access to social and economic inclusion services and shock-responsive 
safety nets for poor and vulnerable households.  
 
Evidence on Adaptation to Inflation: (HSNP Annual Review, 2014; 2016; 2017; 
2018 & Project completion Review, 2018) 
DFID held a contingency budget (6% of total costs) that is set aside to cover: (i) inflation costs; 
and (ii) transition payments for people moving in and out of the programme due to better 
targeting.  
The transfers received by households (the largest component of the programme) were shown to 
be significantly affected by (i) the shilling value of the transfer – i.e. inflation; and (ii) the shilling-
sterling exchange rate.  The real value of the transfer was safeguarded using an assumption of 
(a) a 5% Kenyan inflation rate and (b) 3% nominal depreciation of the Kenyan shilling against 
sterling. 
Monthly cost per transfer value (per household) increased from KSH 2,300 to KSH 2,450 in 
August 2014 and KSH 2,550 as of July 2015. DFID’s analysis suggests cash transfer is keeping 
pace with inflation under the NSNP.  
 
Lessons Learnt: (HSNP Annual Review, 2018) 
 Although cash transfer payment was based on the evidence/assumption that cash transfers 
generally offer better Value for Money (VfM) than food aid (with lower admin costs and better 
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effectiveness), there are some conditions under which this does not hold e.g. if local food 
prices are significantly higher than international prices before the cash transfer takes place, 
and if the supply of food through local markets is limited so that cash transfers result in food 
price inflation.  
 The value of the transfer is currently being boosted by a value which takes account of a) a 
5% a year to account for inflation based on IMF predications of inflation (CPI) at the time of 
HSNP’s design. b) 3% nominal depreciation of the Kenyan shilling against sterling. 
Nevertheless, actual inflation rates should instead be used. A procedure has been initiated to 
involve the wider NSNP – so that re-calculations are done using actual CPI rates. This could 
potentially persuade other cash transfers to use a similar process. 
 HSNP has also, unfortunately, led to some opportunistic price hikes in a few cases – 
particularly during payment days. Nonetheless, the main inflationary pressures stem from 
outside factors beyond the control of HSNP programme.   
 In the Beneficiary Feedback from field visits, beneficiaries noted that regular and routine 
transfers were allowing them to be better fed, pay for children’s’ school fees and medical 
emergencies, and be better clothed and build better homes. Some funds were used to re-
stock livestock holdings.  
o Where beneficiaries had obtained a lump sum payment, most had decided to invest 
in productive investments that would produce a longer return – for instance, investing 
in bigger livestock herds; starting a business (e.g. selling food items, clothes, goods); 
and even driving lessons.  
o All noted that cash was their preference to food and that it presented them with a 
sense of dignity and choice. All welcomed the lump sum payments but noted that the 
predictability and timely payment of the regular amount permitted them to plan better 
and be able to deal with ‘emergencies.’  
o None reported that the cash transfer was having an adverse effect on prices and all 
said they could purchase almost everything they wanted in the market.  
o Most beneficiaries noted that due to the drought, food prices have increased 
significantly and asked if the amount of the cash transfer could be raised, since 
the real value has dwindled overtime. Notwithstanding the limited programme 
resources, this is important feedback and should inform the assessment on future 
sustainable funding for the HSNP.  
 
 
3.4 Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty programme (Ghana) 
Brief Programme Summary: (LEAP Business Case, 2013 & Annual Review, 2017)  
 Full title: Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
 Programme Value: £36,369,080 
 Estimated No. of recipients: 100,000 people, 60% women 
 Start Date Aug. 2012 & End Date: Dec. 2017 
 Programme Code: 201629 
 DevTracker link to business case: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
201629/documents 
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Programme Details: (LEAP Business Case, 2013) 
On the business case, DFID agreed to provide £30,900,000 over 5 years (FY 2012 - 2016) to 
expand the coverage of the Ghanaian national cash transfer programme and enhance the 
effectiveness and sustainability.  This will be supplied to fund the transfers themselves with an 
extra amount allocated to building vital systems and capacity.    
The Government of Ghana is seeking to address difficulties and is running a programme that 
delivers regular, small cash grants to the poorest and most vulnerable people.  Yet, the 
government needs further support to run this programme at a bigger scale and to do so 
effectively.  DFID’s backing will enable 100,000 of the poorest people in Ghana, including 60,000 
women and girls, to obtain regular cash grants.   
People use their grants to buy food and other necessities.  The programme is expected to have a 
noticeable positive impact on food security and nutrition, and on children going to school.  
Beneficiaries of the programme can also access free health care under the national health 
insurance scheme. The government plans to link other programmes such as the free school 
uniform programme to the cash grant programme via a new targeting mechanism. Generally, it is 
estimated that the impact of the cash transfer programme will be that an extra 269,000 people 
will be lifted out of poverty over the next 20 years. 
DFID’s assistance will also guarantee that the cash grant programme provides better value for 
money by reducing the cost of delivering grants by 75%.  This will be done by utilizing technology 
to allow faster and more reliable transfers.  In addition to helping the government to bolster their 
own monitoring and evaluation, DFID will conduct its own monitoring and fiduciary checks.     
  
Evidence on Adaptation to Inflation: (LEAP Annual Review, 2014; 2015; 2017) 
The LEAP Business Case stated that average payment per household will be raised in line with 
inflation. Yet, according to the LEAP Annual Review of 2015, the cash payment size remained at 
GHS 36 since end of 2011. Because of inflation, the real value of the grant has been 
eroded. DFID, The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP) and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) have worked together to make the case for boosting the grant size to 
GHS 44. Indeed, the Annual Review from 2017 indicated that cash payment size was raised to 
GHS 44 (£7.76).  However, given the continued level of inflation, the real value of the grant is 
declining again.  Maintaining the real value should not be overlooked as the Government 
continues to expand the programme.  
 
Lessons Learnt: (LEAP Annual Review, 2017) 
 High inflation rate is diminishing the real value of the grant.  Going forward, the value of 
the cash grants must be part of the consultations on programme’s budget.     
 An analysis conducted towards the end of 2011 revealed that the size of the LEAP grant has 
been too little to be very effective.   So, it has been agreed that the grants should be 
revised upwards annually (broadly in line with inflation) to maintain their value. 
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3.5 Keeping Girls in School (KGIS) Programme (Malawi) 
Brief Programme Summary: (KGIS Business Case, 2012 & Project completion 
Review, 2019)  
 Full title: Keeping Girls in School (KGIS) Programme 
 Programme Value (full life): £36,864,997 
 Start Date June. 2016 & End Date: Sept. 2018 
 Estimated No. of recipients (business case): Cash transfers for 200,000 girls in primary 
school and ‘bursaries’ for 18,000 girls in secondary school.3  
 Programme Code: 201629 
 DevTracker link to business case: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202623/documents 
 
Programme Details: (KGIS Business Case, 2012) 
The KGIS programme was launched to help eliminate the cultural and socioeconomic barriers 
hampering girl’s participation in primary and secondary schools. This was intended at increasing 
enrolment of girls in upper primary school (standards 7-8) and secondary school – thus, delaying 
sexual debut, early pregnancies and early marriages, and presenting an opportunity for a better 
life for graduating girls and their future children. Among a long list of components, the KGIS was 
applied through the following cash/bursary transfer components: 
 Cash transfers - £8.32 million (2015-2018). Save the Children UK (SC) delivered cash to 
underprivileged girls in Standards 7-8 
 Provision of secondary school bursaries to marginalised girls - £12.9 million (2013 – 2018). 
Campaign for Female Education (CAMFED) provided bursaries to girls in forms 1-4 of 
secondary education in 15 districts and operated with local stakeholders to provide 
psychosocial support and to help identify marginalised girls.4  
 
Evidence on Adaptation to Inflation: (KGIS Project completion Review, 2018 & 
Annual Review, 2013; 2017) 
Recent scarcities of foreign exchange and fuel in Malawi (as well as the subsequent devaluation 
of the Malawi Kwacha by 50%) led to high inflation. The inflation episode mostly affected the cost 
and timeframe of implementing project activities. With DFID’s decision to permit project budgets 
and disbursement to be carried out in Pound Sterling, only the Kwacha value of the project 
increased without affecting DFID’s funding commitment. By itself, the cost driver was alleviated 
                                                   
3 Also,100,000 girls with access to enhanced sanitation facilities at school; 3000 mother groups trained to deliver 
counselling and support to girls; 21,500 in service female teachers trained to act as better role models to girls and 
thousands more of new female teachers trained (KGIS Business case, 2012). 
4 Bursaries comprised of tuition fees and entitled provisions; a pair of shoes, two pairs of socks, a skirt and two 
blouses, sweater, scientific calculator, one mathematical set and one school bag – supplied once to students very 
two years; ten hard cover books – supplied every year; and ten exercise books, five pens and two packs of 
sanitary wear – supplied three times in a year 
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and kept under control. In one case (i.e. ‘Development Aid from People to People’ project), up to 
20% of the project budget accrued from forex exchange gains.  
In 2012, the cost of a bursary per student was set at £100 per girl. Following the economic 
shocks that led to inflation and deflation of the local currency, there was an increase in cost of 
entitlements in the years 2013-2016. The entitlement costs peaked at £152 in 2016/17. This led 
to DFID negotiating with the implementing agent of the secondary school bursary to tailor the 
entitlements to the needs of the students. This helped to reduce the unit costs to £129.  
 
Lessons Learnt: (KGIS Project completion Review, 2018) 
 There were a number of other cost drivers that were not identified during programme 
design, including: the cost for providing bursaries (including supplies in bursary packs), 
construction inflation (including material price increases), remoteness of sites, payment 
mechanism for the cash transfer, strength of the economy, currency depreciation and fuel 
availability.  
 KGIS has succeeded in coordinating the cash transfer programme, secondary school bursary 
support and other interventions through existing systems – instead of creating new parallel 
structures for programme implementation. This will likely aide in the longer-term sustainability 
of the project  
 
4. Brief Look at the Experience of CT Programmes in 
Southern Africa 
4.1 Botswana 
Botswana runs some of the broadest social cash transfer systems in the region - including 
separate cash transfer programmes for elderly people, orphans, and people living with 
disabilities. For example, the cash transfers through the ‘Old Age Pension Programme’ 
assists a large percentage of Botswana’s population. Launched in 1996 after its announcement 
in the annual budget speech (Devereux and Pelham 2005), the Old Age Pension cash transfer 
scheme has the aim of financially supporting elderly people who do not have other sources 
of assistance. The commissioner for social benefits, an official in the Ministry of Local 
Government, manages the programme (Gaolathe 2009). The number of beneficiaries rose from 
about 70,000 in 2000 to 89,471 in early 2009. Benefits indirectly reach about 42% of the 
population (Devereux and Pelham 2005). Samson and Kaniki (2008) estimate that cash transfers 
through the programme costs 0.4% of Botswana’s gross domestic product (GDP) annually. 
Overall, the transfer’s real value, corrected annually for inflation, has remained between 
US$27 and US$30 (BFTU, 2007).5  
 
                                                   
5 The original transfer value was P 100 (US$30), and this was indexed to civil servants’ pay levels. By 2007, the 
monthly transfer was P 166 (US$26) (BFTU, 2007). 
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4.2 Zambia 
Zambia implemented pilot cash transfer programmes in five districts. The programmes 
employ various designs with the aim of incorporating lessons learned from the programmes into 
a scaled-up national program. Pilots jointly reach more than 12,000 households. Zambia’s 
Social Cash Transfer pilots build on the Kalomo district pilot. Zambia’s Kalomo SCT pilot began 
in 2003 and extended into four additional pilot districts (Chipata, Katete, Kazungula, and Monze) 
from 2005 to 2007. Total annual costs per household amount to Kwacha 660,000 (US$165) 
on average (in Kalomo district). Transfers are made on a bimonthly basis, and they are supposed 
to be raised by 10% every two years to account for inflation (Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services 2007). The transfers covered the price of a 50-kilogram bag of 
maize, which is assumed to allow a household of six individuals to consume an additional meal 
per day (Schüring 2010). Even if not enough to cover the poverty gap, this amount was believed 
to pull people from extreme poverty (Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, 
2007 and German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 2007).  
 
4.3 Zimbabwe 
Government-Supported Cash Transfers 
Zimbabwe has had a range of cash transfer programmes, including a programme known as the 
Public Assistance Programme dating back before independence. Cash transfers through the 
Public Assistance Programme was offered a legal support in the Welfare Assistance Act of 
1988 (Munro, 2005). Its coverage plateaued at 69,308 individual recipients in 1994 and fell to 
20,562 by 1998. The grants were mainly given to destitute elderly individuals who could not work 
and did not have families to support them, even if others, such as children in desperate 
circumstances, people with disabilities, and the chronically sick, were also entitled. The 
programme was not well publicized, potential recipients had to travel to district offices to apply, 
and transfer sizes, which were comparatively small to begin with, did not keep pace with the 
high inflation in Zimbabwe. It is not clear if the programme still operational (Garcia and 
Moore, 2012). 
Some of the other notable government supported cash transfers, which operated around the 
late 2000s, included the Care for the Elderly Program, Support to Families in Distress, 
Maintenance of Disabled Persons, Support to Children in Difficult Circumstances, Maintenance of 
Hero’s Dependents, and Drought Relief and Public Works Programme (RHVP 2007). In 2005, 
the Care for the Elderly programme had 39,468 recipients, Support to Families in Distress had 
39,278 beneficiaries, and Maintenance of Disabled Persons had 21,535 recipients. The Drought 
Relief and Public Works Programme intended to help vulnerable households during times of 
chronic drought. From September 2005 to May 2006, 2.9 million recipients obtained transfers 
through this program. Transfer values ranged from Z$445,720 (US$45) through Z$528,571 
(US$53). By early 2007, transfers were usually new Z$8,000 (US$23) for adults and new 
Z$4,000 (US$12) for children (RHVP 2007). It is unclear how these grants have evolved in 
response to Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation and economic hardships over the last decade 
(Garcia and Moore, 2012). 
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Donor-Supported Cash Transfers: The Protracted Relief 
Programme  
DFID has funded cash transfers (and in-kind assistance) through the Protracted Relief 
Programme (PRP) in Zimbabwe. The programme began in 2004. The program’s second five-
year phase, funded by more than US$130 million, began in mid-2008. Contributing partners 
included 28 international organizations, NGOs, and technical partners that apply the programme 
through 30 local organizations under the responsibility of a consulting firm (GRM International), 
which had the task of managing and coordinating the project. (Garcia and Moore, 2012) 
The PRP focus on extremely poor households that are vulnerable to adverse shocks. The 
program’s aims are to lower the reliance of households on food aid by boosting their food 
production, to enhance access to basic water and sanitation services, and to care for the 
chronically ill (DFID 2008). The programme delivered in-kind transfers of farming inputs, training 
in agricultural activities, and home care for the chronically ill. It also provided cash and vouchers 
to households that typically received in-kind assistance. Early work with cash was stopped in 
2007 because of hyperinflation, low food supplies, and the breakdown of Zimbabwe’s 
financial sector. (Garcia and Moore, 2012) 
Because of hyperinflation, the programme started to distribute cash in foreign currencies, 
around March 2009. Households received US$20 per month. The PRP is estimated to reach 2 
million individuals, i.e. between 15% and 20% of the country’s population (European University 
Institute, 2010). Coverage of cash transfers in the PRP are a lot more limited. In 2009/10, six 
NGOs applied cash transfers in two rural and eight urban districts, targeting 3,425 households. 
The programme functioned outside of the Zimbabwean government, even if it hoped to ultimately 
transition into the system. (Garcia and Moore, 2012) 
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